Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, that is an interesting exercise in conjecture. I take it that some people would have contended that the continuance of a public stake in this area might bring additional rewards to taxpayers, which is an important concern. Of course, they would also need to take it into account that this is a high-risk industry; the bids that the nuclear industry may make for a potential new-build in China are high-risk. My noble friend might think that the public ought not to sustain such a high-risk strategy.

Lord Renton: My Lords, should we not bear it in mind that in most countries where British mothers give birth to children, those children do not have British nationality but will have the nationality of the country where they were born? On the other hand, is it not highly desirable that children born here of foreign parents should not have British nationality because it would give them a status in this country that they may never be here to enjoy again? I know that this is a big subject but, bearing in mind the complexities of it, would the Government consider a change in the law?

Railway Franchises

Lord Triesman: My Lords, it would be wholly desirable for the African Union to take—even if it paused for three months to give Zimbabwe the opportunity to respond—the fullest opportunity to ensure that its critical analysis is upheld. I agree with the noble Lord in those terms. It is fair to say that we have seen several useful initiatives of a kind that we have not seen before. President Obasanjo and President Konare sent a delegation which, unfortunately, Mugabe would not receive. Kofi Annan sent Anna Tibaijuka, who wrote an outstanding and damning report, and recently the South Africans have, for the first time, placed political conditions on any further financial help, which thus far they have declined to provide. We are seeing the beginning of the tide turning in a different direction, and I am happy that that has happened.

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, the commission says in its report that it is,
	"deeply concerned by the continued undermining of the independence of the judiciary through the harassment and intimidation of independent judges . . . and the lack of respect for the rule of law".
	It calls on the Government of Zimbabwe to uphold the principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. Does Her Majesty's Government share and endorse the recommendations of the African states, and are they prepared to take any action open to them to support the independence of the judiciary and to be seen to do so whenever the opportunity arises?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, is right in saying that government Amendment No. 65, which would have led into the conversation we have just had on Clause 15, would bite on this. For the House's clarification it might help if I explained how Amendment No. 65 fits in with the response I intend to make on her Amendment No. 66A, because the two go together. In doing so, I hope to deal also with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, on free prescriptions, not least because he is talking about Amendment No. 33, which he moved on the first day of Report on 16 January. If that suits the House it might get us back to where we should be.
	My Amendment No. 65, which was passed by the House, has the effect of preventing the information contained in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1, which is the audit log, from being provided under Clause 17 to public service providers. Noble Lords will recall that Clause 17 enables the provision of information to public service providers for the purpose of verifying the identity of a person who has applied for a service. As my amendment has been accepted, the audit log will no longer be provided under Clause 17. The amendment I moved and that was passed was tabled in response to the concerns raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I was grateful to him for raising that issue so that we could deal with it.
	The noble Lord asked about prescription charges. The amendment that he would have moved would have given the individuals the option of whether an audit log should be kept of those occasions when an identity card is checked with the individual's consent under Clause 14. For the reasons that I gave earlier, which were recorded in Hansard, we believed that it would be wrong to allow the possibility of individuals deciding for themselves whether some checks against the register should be logged. If that happened, there would be no record to use in cases of complaint and it would mean that a fraudster trying to use someone else's card could insist that no record was kept of that transaction.
	At the same time, we thought again about the second part of the noble Lord's amendment. I hope that we have made it plain that it is no part of our intention to compel people to produce ID cards for prescriptions that are free. I know that there was a debate about whether we would need to do so for ophthalmic and other issues—dental treatment was mentioned on the previous occasion—and I want to make it clear that it is not our intention so to do. We do not think that the noble Lord's concern is well founded.
	I turn to the noble Baroness's Amendment No. 66A, which would remove paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of Clause 18. As noble Lords know, Clause 18 is designed to provide a general safeguard that in most circumstances people will not be forced to use an identity card to prove identity in advance of compulsion. Thus, in line with Clause 18(1), it would not be possible for, let us say, a bank or building to require a customer to produce an identity card as the only acceptable proof of identity in advance of compulsion. The safeguard in Clause 18 still allows an identity card to be one of the methods accepted for proving identity, provided that a reasonable alternative method of establishing identity is also allowed. It would no longer apply once it is compulsory to register and to hold an identity card.
	The words in Clause 18(2)(a) that would be removed by Amendment No. 66A serve a purpose. This subsection would allow a requirement to be imposed to produce an identity card in advance of compulsion if it had been imposed under Clause 15, which deals with making public services conditional on the production of an identity card or any other enactment. However, any regulations under Clause 15 would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so Parliament would have the opportunity to debate and agree them. Moreover, as provided in Clause 15(2), any such regulation in advance of compulsion could not apply to the payment of benefits or to the delivery of any free public service. I hope that gives as clear a reassurance as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, would wish for.
	We should not rule out in future providing that identity cards be required to be produced if that is a condition of other legislation, which also would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Accordingly, we believe that the drafting of Clause 18 is satisfactory. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I am certainly happy to look at the matter, but, as I said earlier, the safeguard exists through the affirmative resolution procedure. Any regulations for monitoring this situation would have to come before both Houses for debate and therefore be agreed in the way in which we have clearly set out.
	I have also given the assurance that it is not our intention that the provision should operate in a way that would make an identity card compulsory for free prescriptions. I have given assurances also in relation to those other matters.
	I hope that I have explained why we are unable to accept the wording of Amendment No. 66A of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, which was spoken to so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe. I recognise that she was trying to find a safeguard against the enforced use of identity checks in advance of compulsion. She made that clear in the way in which she explained the amendment. In giving further consideration to Clause 18 safeguards, we are investigating the possibility that a loophole exists. The provisions in Clause 18 are designed to ensure that organisations cannot insist on production of an identity card as exclusive means of proving identity prior to compulsion unless, as we have already discussed, this has been required by an affirmative order under the required identity checks provisions for public services in Clauses 15 to 17 or in accordance with another enactment.
	However, the clause does not deal expressly with the possibility of an organisation requiring a person to obtain a copy of their record held on the national identity register by exercising their subject access rights under the Data Protection Act or by making use of the proposed online facility to check one's own records. We should properly look at and tighten up all those things. However, if we do what I have indicated for Clause 18, I do not think that the noble Lord's concern about Clause 15will be a problem, particularly bearing in mind the assurance I have given. Should we conclude that there is a need to tighten matters, we will return with a government amendment to Clause 18 at Third Reading. My officials will be in touch with the Information Commissioner's Office to alert it to the precise details of the amendment before it is tabled. I hope that by looking at Clause 18 we will be able to close any gaps that remain and that the noble Lord would be content with what we now have in Clause 15, limited as it is by the tightening that we hope to be able to do on Clause 18. I think that that meets the needs both of the noble Baroness and of the noble Lord as well.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, pre-shadowed my response to why this is unnecessary. I have to tell the noble Lord that Bob is my grandfather, my uncle, my brother and my nephew, so as far as that is concerned, we think that the Human Rights Act is enough here. I also need to say to the noble Lord, with reference to Clause 16, that it is not superfluous or meaningless: it imposes a duty to consult where regulations are made under that clause and there is an existing statutory duty under other relevant powers. It has some real function and is therefore significantly different from the measure suggested by the noble Lord.
	I understand what the noble Lady, Baroness Anelay of St Johns, says about agreeing in essence; we too think it absolutely essential that there should be proper and good governance in this matter. The proposition that the powers under Clauses 19 to 22 must be exercised "reasonably and proportionately" derives from the Secretary of State's public law duties and the provisions of the Human Rights Act. As ever, we are most reluctant to reiterate obligations that already apply. The clear implication of doing so would be that without such wording it would be lawful for a power to be exercised unreasonably or disproportionately. I am sure that that is not what the noble Lord intends.
	Aside from that, we unfortunately consider the noble Lord's amendment to be flawed, in that it seeks to place the duty to act reasonably and proportionately directly upon civil servants. As noble Lords are aware, under the aspect of our constitution often referred to as the Carltona principle, the Secretary of State remains accountable for the actions of his officials. Those actions are, constitutionally speaking, his actions, albeit carried out by his civil servants. If information were provided under Clauses 19 to 22 in an unreasonable or disproportionate way, it would be the Secretary of State who would answer for it.
	Nevertheless, I recognise the sentiment behind the noble Lord's amendment; we are acutely aware that those individuals whose job it will be to provide information under Clauses 19 to 22 will have to be well trained in order to ensure that such disclosures are within the terms of legislation—that they are reasonable and proportionate. There will be guidance and procedures to this effect. The power to provide information without consent does not mean that the information must or should be provided whenever it is requested. We will make sure that procedures not only govern the way in which a request for information is made, but ensure that the information is provided only when the request is reasonable and proportionate.
	I would, therefore, ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. I very much take on board what the noble Lady says about making procedures clear, simple and available to members of the public. Indeed, we have sought to do that with administrative law generally, making it easier for people to challenge and, by the way in which they challenge, enabling us to be sure that they are taking full opportunity to do so.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I am thankful for the Minister's remarks. To clear up one legal point that she raised, I beg to differ with her on the Carltona decision and the reference in the relevant clause to civil servants. I do not believe that "persons" here refers to individual civil servants. It is a reference to the persons referred to in Clauses 19 to 22, which are authorities, not civil servants. But let us leave that little joust aside and get to the nub of the matter, which is that the Minister is sympathetic but unmoved by my desire to have this made plain in the Bill. I cannot at this stage do more than withdraw the amendment, but I shall speak to the Minister between stages, because I am terrier-like in my wish to make the Bill more sympathetic to the layman. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: My Lords, the amendment seeks clarification from the Minister on an issue that I first raised in Committee on 16 November, in cols. 1175–77; it was rather a long debate, as noble Lords can tell from the column references. I was concerned that an amendment made on Report in another place may have had unintended consequences and might allow sensitive personal data to be added to the national identity register.
	Clause 1(6) was added by the Government without debate, because the guillotine prevented it. It was added in good faith by the Government to meet objections that had been raised in another place by the Minister's honourable friends. Their concern and that of Members throughout the House was that the drafting of Clause 1 meant that the database could contain sensitive personal data. The main concern had been that medical and criminal records could be added to the national identity register.
	After Committee, the Minister wrote to me to explain why the Government believed that their drafting of subsection (6) remains benign. But she admitted in that letter that there cannot be a complete exclusion of information tending to reveal sensitive personal data from the registrable facts at Clause 1(5) because a photograph or nationality may of itself tend to reveal such data as racial ethnic origin, which is covered by the Data Protection Act 1998. But she argued that that is information that everybody would expect to be on a register. That sounds like common sense, but she will understand that I remain a little uneasy about the position on sensitive data and, like the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, I believe that this is a Bill that changes the relationship between state and citizen so much that it is the duty of all of us to ensure that we get it as right as possible for the citizen.
	The reason why I brought back this amendment, for clarification only, is that I believe that it will be consistent with the position that the Government have taken in the Minister's letter. It would simply ensure that the Secretary of State could not process sensitive personal data that were covered by Section 29 of the Data Protection Act 1998. Will the Minister give me a clear assurance that that is the position that the Government intend to adopt in the setting up and running of the national identity register? I hope that she will explain why she feels that it would not be better to have this in the Bill. I know that she will attempt to do so; let us see if she manages to persuade me. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I shall be very happy to seek to do so. The noble Baroness is right to refer to the content of the letter and the reasons we have set out. It is important just to run through what "sensitive data" means, because it emphasises why a photograph could arguably be sensitive data. I say "arguably" because people tend to fall on both sides of the argument. Some say that it is not sensitive data—it is just a photograph; whereas others say that it is sensitive data. That is what causes us the difficulty.
	Some noble Lords may not be familiar with the definition of "sensitive data", so I shall remind the House what it is. It is the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject; his political opinions; his religious beliefs; whether he is a member of a trade union; his physical or mental health; his sexual life; the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence; any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to be committed by him, and the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court.
	It is clear to those noble Lords who are now familiar with Schedule 1 to the Bill that the register will not contain substantive information falling within any of those categories. Moreover, any addition to the list of information in Schedule 1 would have to be consistent with the statutory purposes, which in effect rules out any possibility of adding, for example, medical or criminal records. However, as I have indicated, it is arguable that information that is in itself innocuous is in fact sensitive personal data within the DPA definition. For example, a photograph may reveal someone's racial origin or indicate a particular disability or religion, perhaps because they are wearing a capel, a turban or something of that sort.
	So one sees why the debate over photographs comes about. I am sure the noble Baroness is not seeking to prevent the provision of photographic information from the register without consent; for example, to the police under Clause 19(3)(b) for the detection of a crime, and that could quite possibly be the effect of amendment No. 74A. For the reasons I have given, I hope she will feel comfortable about withdrawing it. I understand perfectly why, in the normal way, the issues that would fall within "sensitive data" would be excluded. If there were not an argument about the photograph, I would have been happy with the amendment, but there is. There will be those who say the photograph clearly identifies a number of those issues, and that is our problem.

The Earl of Northesk: My Lords, as your Lordships will be aware, we debated this somewhat late in the day in Committee. I hope, therefore, that I may be forgiven for returning to the issue today, although happily I need not weary the House with a detailed explanation of its purpose, which is straightforward: namely, to propose that the Secretary of State draw up statutory guidelines in respect of the information disclosure provisions of the Bill, with the intention that these be enforceable in law. I have been consistent in my pessimism about the Government accepting the amendment, on the basis—and here I echo an earlier comment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips—that it will be argued it is unnecessary because the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act will apply to this legislation in any event. The Minister made that case in Committee. Indeed, when I sought to amend the Children Act 2004 in a similar way, my efforts were rebuffed for the same reason, although it is perhaps worth noting that at that time the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, replying for the Government, made the point:
	"We are clear that comprehensive statutory guidance is needed".—[Official Report, 15/7/04; col. 1431.]
	That was buttressed in the 19th report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which observed:
	"We welcome the Government's acceptance of the need for comprehensive statutory guidance on information sharing, in response to an amendment proposed by"
	myself, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. It may be somewhat presumptuous of me, but I infer from that that at least some elements of the legislative process have sympathy with my purpose here.
	That aside, revelations in respect of a number of related matters over the past few weeks have reinforced my conviction that some form of additional protection for the public in this area is essential. First, your Lordships will of course have noted the recent disclosure that some 24,000 young people aged between 10 and 18 are having their DNA profiles routinely stored, despite the fact that they have never been charged or cautioned for an offence. That is a matter that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, raised in a Starred Question last week. The structure of the Bill, as I have repeatedly argued, allows a great deal of cross-pollination between the national identity register and other government databases. It is entirely possible that the ID card scheme could in the future be used to cross-reference DNA data. Evidently, that flies in the face of the assertions that the Minister made on the point throughout our scrutiny of the Bill.
	We all understand that there are legitimate, perhaps even virtuous, arguments in favour of the utility of databases storing DNA profiles. However, it is essential that their establishment should not happen, as it were, by stealth, but should be subject to open and transparent parliamentary debate. Certainly this matter would seem to argue in favour of the new clause, the more so given that there have been indications that the Home Office may be in the process of reviewing its retention and deletion policy in this area.
	Secondly, your Lordships will also have noted the front-page story in a recent copy of the Times  revealing that three chief constables have won a landmark appeal to the Information Tribunal against the Information Commissioner. As a result, from April this year, records of all criminal convictions and cautions, however minor, will remain on file pretty much indefinitely. Again, we can all accept and recognise the efficacy of using such data within databases for the prevention and detection of criminal and even terrorist activity. Nevertheless, as a non-lawyer, I cannot square the circle between retaining data—albeit "available to police eyes only"—for 100 or so years and the fifth data protection principle, which states:
	"personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes".
	There is also the announcement from the Home Office Minister, Andy Burnham, that ID cards will,
	"incorporate a 'contactless' or 'proximity' chip",
	reliant on RFID—radio frequency identification. The fact is that this technology can be and is used to track the location and movement of items in which it is embedded. ID cards would effectively come with a built-in facility permitting knowledge of the whereabouts of the holder for every second of every day. That is an especially pertinent issue regarding the security of the scheme. All those developments persuade me that, however persuasive the Minister may be in arguing the case, the comfort and security afforded by the Data Protection Act are far from adequate.
	In Committee, the Minister suggested that an argument against the new clause is that,
	"what is lawful for [recipients of information] to do with it will depend on each recipient's own common law and statutory powers".—[Official Report, 14/12/05; col. 1355.]
	In other words, it will be difficult to codify the Bill's disclosure of information provisions because they stretch across such a wide variety of agencies. To my way of thinking, that makes it all the more necessary to do so. It is precisely because current arrangements for disclosure are such a mishmash that guidelines, statutorily based and enforceable in law, are unnecessary. Such a codification should reflect the different approaches adopted by different agencies, thereby creating greater transparency of the regime. Merely because such a task might be difficult should not in any way militate against it being done.
	In fact, the new clause buttresses a central recommendation of Sir Michael Bichard's inquiry into the Soham murders. Recommendation 8 of the report states that, in respect of police IT systems:
	"A Code of Practice should be produced",
	which, in the words of Recommendation 9:
	"must clearly set out the key principles of good information management (capture, review, retention, deletion and sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the individual and the law".
	The Home Office's progress report of last month identifies that the full set of guidance recommended by Sir Michael Bichard was available as of October last year. To that extent, the new clause—in so far as it applies to Clauses 19 and 20—is entirely consistent with the policy imperatives being pursued by the Home Office. Indeed, while it is idle to speculate, it is conceivable that much of the recent controversy about List 99 and the sex offender register might have been avoided had the new clause, or something like it, already been properly implemented. Dare I say it, but, viewed from this perspective, the Government should be minded to approach the amendment with a healthy measure of sympathy.
	I add a few thoughts about this, in part reflecting some of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, last week. The Home Office has announced, almost with pride, that 7 per cent of the UK population will have their DNA profiles stored in two years' time, thereby reinforcing the UK's position as the world leader in the practice. For example, this compares with the EU average of 1.13 per cent, and 0.5 per cent in the United States.
	Some 20 per cent of the total CCTV cameras deployed in the world are to be found in the UK. Under the current Administration, the UK population has become subject to greater level of state surveillance than almost anywhere else in the world. This necessarily begs the question of whether the rights and protections of our citizens in this area have kept pace with what some might be tempted to call the Government's infatuation with snooping. There are legitimate reasons for supposing that the powers of the Information Commissioner and associated legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1998 are proving ever more inadequate, as perhaps exemplified by the decision of the Information Tribunal to which I referred earlier.
	By the same token, it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that the Information Commissioner has had just cause in the past to bemoan an absence of appropriate enforcement powers. The new clause is therefore intended to offer some redress in this area.
	In conclusion, I repeat my assertion that the new clause or something like it is necessary to act as belt and braces to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998, and to give both the national identity scheme and information commissioners adequately sharp teeth. As my noble friend Lord Crickhowell pointed out in Committee, it would go a long way towards mitigating many of the anxieties that many of us have about the Bill. I beg to move.

The Earl of Erroll: My Lords, I support this amendment; if I had been a bit more organised, I would have added my name to it. As I have stated before, we need greater protections in this Bill to ensure that the "Big Brother" culture does not get out of control.
	I have sat in on many debates on government data-sharing in various organisations to which I belong at which people from various government departments have been present. It is clear that no one is exactly sure what is allowed and what is not. There are also a lot of data-sharing initiatives which I am not sure would, strictly speaking, be permitted under the Bill.
	Oversight of all this data sharing by the Office of the Information Commissioner is essential. We know, however, that that office is underfunded and overloaded—particularly since the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It is clear that many government departments do not know when they should be referring to the Information Commissioner. By embodying that in the Bill, we will make it much clearer to government departments what they should be doing, who they should be consulting and how.
	I was thinking of trying to introduce a privacy impact assessment clause into this Bill. When I read the amendment, however, I decided that this was probably a much better way of going about it, which is why I support it. The old argument that we should not worry because we have got the ECHR and all the human rights bodies out there holds no water. How are you to get a case together? Who is going to bring it? How does a citizen do that? It is unworkable; people feel powerless.
	For example, there is a lot of talk about the fact that local authority valuation officers will be allowed to come into your home and photograph the interior, which has all sorts of privacy and security implications. A lot of people are very concerned about that. They would like to take it to the European Court of Human Rights. My attitude has been to wonder where is the legislation that permits this. They have been clearly told that this is going to happen.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I hate to interrupt the noble Lord, but I made it plain in answering a recent Question in your Lordship's House that the proposition which the noble Lord sets out is complete nonsense. Photographs are only ever taken by valuation officers with the express authority of the occupier.

The Earl of Erroll: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reassurance. I hope that someone out there reads it and publishes it in the press, for there are still many concerned citizens who believe that the previous story is correct and are wondering what they can do about it. That feeling of powerlessness among the people is significant, and I am glad to have had that proposition knocked on the head.
	However, the feeling about ID cards will be the same, which is why I used that example. I was pretty certain that it could not be done, but most of the public out there were not, and did not know how to find out. A provision such as this is essential so that the public know that they are protected and know where to go to find out whether the protection is working. That is why I heartily support the amendment.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, on tabling this amendment. I should have thought that the Government would consider it to be very helpful. We have heard a good deal about the surveillance society. It is very much with us, and will be with us a lot more when the Bill, and other Bills to come, are passed. I feel quite sure that when Orwell wrote 1984, he did not envisage that this country would be the sort of county he wrote about. He would have been quite horrified if he had realised that eventually we were going to have a compulsory register and compulsory identification cards for every citizen in our land. I believe that he did not think that that could possibly apply in Britain. But, of course, here it is—and it is applying.
	The Minister has told us very often that the proposals in the Bill have the overwhelming support of the British public. I do not believe that is true. It may be that a focus group has come up with 72 per cent in favour, but I can assure her that the conversation on the buses—I do not know whether she ever goes on the buses—and my postbag tell me that there is a large opposition to this measure. The more people know about it and the more people begin to understand what is at stake, the less they like it. Indeed, Swindon Borough Council, I am glad to say, passed a resolution last week against the imposition of identity cards and an identity register.
	There is much that should concern us about the Bill. The good thing about this amendment is that it will at least give some reassurance to those people who are concerned that their individual liberty and their individual circumstances could be affected by the Bill, particularly when the register and the ID cards become compulsory.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I have listened with great care and interest to all the comments that have been made. I think it is wonderful when one has four Earls speaking to one amendment. I commend them for that if nothing else.
	If one looks at the matters that have been spoken to in relation to the amendment, one finds that two issues have been conflated, so let me separate them out. The first issue concerns DNA, and the other concerns the use to which it should be put in relation to ID cards. I hope that I have made it clear throughout our debate that DNA is not included in Schedule 1 and therefore cannot be stored on the register. Nor are there powers to take DNA samples.
	To put the matter entirely beyond doubt, I am happy to tell your Lordships that the Government intend to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to limit the registrable facts under Clause 1 to external characteristics, which is something that we debated long and hard when the matter was raised—by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, in particular—in relation to how to differentiate between internal and external characteristics. The issue of a future government was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk—I am constantly being told that I am very benign—as a way to undermine my argument. A future government would be prevented from adding DNA to the information that might be added to Schedule 1 by affirmative order. I hope that we can put the debate on DNA to bed. It will not be part of this Bill.
	I can tell the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, that it is not right to suggest that the provisions in the 2001 and 2003 Acts have been unmerited in any way. I hope that the noble Earl was present when I said that more than 3,000 cases have been identified as a result of that material, including rapes and murders. One that stands out in my mind is a 20 year-old offence of the rape and murder of a 14 year-old girl, which was discovered as a result of a minor offence being committed some 20 years later. We are not saying that DNA has not some significance, but DNA and ID cards should be separated.
	Before continuing, I should mention the suggestion that the Secretary of State should issue the guidance. I confess to being a little surprised, given the trenchant criticisms of the Home Office during our debates on the Bill, that noble Lords would want my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, or his successors in title, to be responsible for guidance on information sharing to all public authorities. That is surely the function of the independent Information Commissioner and should be properly dealt with in that way.
	On the issue of contactless ID cards raised by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, I should make it clear that it is currently planned that an ID card will be valid for travel within the EEA. As a result it must comply with the standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. Thus, all countries are considering this very same matter. Standards stipulate that a travel document, such as an ID card, will have to have a contactless or proximity chip. It will require the card to use radio frequencies to allow the card to be read at very short distances of approximately 0 to 2 cm from the reader. That is somewhat similar to the oyster card used on London transport. To prevent the information on such chips being read at a greater distance, the card will implement basic access control, which requires that the machine readable zone—the MRZ—printed on the face of the card is scanned and the information then used to unlock the read and request data from the chip.
	As with e-passports, which the UK Passport Service is beginning to issue from this year, an attempt to read the chip without using the information printed on the MRZ to unlock it will yield no data that can be used to identify an individual. The worry of the noble Earls, Lord Erroll and Lord Northesk, is not merited. The conspiracy theory that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seems to be promulgating about the style of tracking will not occur.
	As for CCTV cameras, I very much take on board the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon. It amplifies how many of the public want to have better protection and want the facility of CCTV cameras. Indeed, we know that they are extremely useful in the detection of crime, not only in relation to terrorists but in identifying recent criminal offenders. None of that bites on this.The noble Earl's amendment would require the Secretary of State to draw up and disseminate guidance to recipients of information from the register relating to disclosure of that information between and among them.
	The noble Earl stressed the importance of data protection and we do not disagree with him. However, the amendment, notwithstanding the fact that it is supported by a number of noble Lords, is misguided. It seeks to give the Secretary of State a role which is more appropriately fulfilled by others, as I have already indicated. Guidance on onward disclosure would necessarily relate predominantly to the legal position. The extent to which, and the circumstances in which, onward disclosure of information by a person who would have received it under these clauses would be lawful would depend on the statutory or common law powers of that particular person and the application of various restrictions from the Human Rights Act through the Data Protection Act to common law duties of confidence. The noble Earl was right to remind your Lordships that I made those points when we last discussed this.
	The police have powers which are different from those of the security agencies, which are in turn different from those of government departments. Recipients of information from the register will no doubt take advice from their respective legal advisers on disclosure of information, wherever that information has derived from. It is not appropriate for the Secretary of State, in exercising his functions under the Bill, to be under an obligation to provide what would amount to detailed and tailor-made legal advice to a wide variety of people, all of whom are already getting that advice from its proper source.
	Subsection (3) of the amendment provides that the guidance produced by the Secretary of State would in particular have to deal with matters such as the security of information and the period of retention. Those are exactly the kind of matters which are governed by the Data Protection Act. In so far as the noble Earl is proposing that guidance should be given in complying with the obligations which derive from the Act, I gently remind him of the primary duties of the Information Commissioner, which are set out in Section 51 of that Act. The first two subsections provide:
	"(1) It shall be the duty of the Commissioner to promote the following of good practice by data controllers and, in particular, so to perform his functions under this Act as to promote the observance of the requirements of this Act by data controllers.
	(2) The Commissioner shall arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as he considers appropriate of such information as it may appear to him expedient to give to the public about the operation of this Act, about good practice, and about other matters within the scope of his functions under this Act, and may give advice to any person as to any of those matters".
	Those are the commissioner's proper functions.
	I take this opportunity to remind the House of some of the safeguards for which the Bill makes provision in relation to those to whom information may be provided from the register. Clause 24(2) requires the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to keep under review the arrangements made by those who can be provided with information from the register for obtaining, recording and using the information. Furthermore, as a result of government amendments, accreditation for organisations provided with information under Clauses 19 to 22, which are not specified in the Bill, will be compulsory. Finally, under Clause 26(2), the Intelligence Services Commissioner is empowered to keep under review the acquisition, storage and use by the intelligence services of information recorded in the national identity register as well as the provision of that information to any member of those services.
	I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and other noble Earls who have spoken, together with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, that to include this further obligation on my right honourable friend or his successors in title is not necessary. Advice on the circumstances in which disclosure would be lawful is that it really is not an appropriate matter for the Secretary of State. It would be tailor-made to each recipient, having regard to the statutory and common law regime surrounding the recipient.
	It is quite clear that it is better for the commissioners to do this job—they are better placed to do it independently and thoroughly, with the appropriate rigour and vigour—than it would be to ask my right honourable friend the Home Secretary simply to duplicate all that work. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Earl will withdraw his amendment.

The Earl of Northesk: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, not least for the level of support that the amendment inspired. As others indicated and I sought to demonstrate in my introduction, my aim here has always been to offer assistance to the Government. I was particularly struck by the comments made by my noble friends Lady Anelay and Lord Crickhowell. They both correctly identified the utility of giving the public—those on whom the ID cards scheme will primarily impact—clear, concise and transparent information about their data. That can only engender better and greater acceptance of the scheme.
	I hear, accept and understand the Minister's comments on DNA. In my introduction, I was content to reflect on the usefulness of it in the detection and prevention of crime. I will not be tempted down the route of explaining why virtually it is possible that the register may have access to DNA—that would become too complicated and it would bore your Lordships to tears.
	With regard to RFID, I merely point out that the chips in biometric passports in Holland have already been forensically hacked from a distance much greater than a few centimetres and decrypted within a matter of hours. In other words, that technology is insecure and raises severe data protection issues. With regard to the Secretary of State's role, interestingly, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, used the reverse argument when we were debating the Children Act. She maintained that the Secretary of State should have responsibility in this area. I suggest that the Government cannot have it both ways depending on which piece of legislation is under consideration. Because my intent with the amendment was to assist the Government, more in weariness than anything else, I should test the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 76) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 155; Not-Contents, 155

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, that is a neat point. However, as I said in addressing the issue precisely when considering the point on commissioners, it would be commonly assumed that the Immigration Services Commissioner and the Intelligence Services Commissioners, as well as other commissioners who are appointed in the same or a similar way to the National Identity Scheme Commissioner do not have their independence compromised. One could fairly argue that they are more than prepared to take a robust and independent line.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am also grateful for that Exocet from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, which was more than a neat point. I thought that it went to the heart of the debate—and, indeed, the Minister hung his hat on mere perception. Perception is important, and it is important here. The Minister talked about the Intelligence Services Commissioner and said that he is appointed by the Prime Minister. I might accept the Prime Minister as an alternative to Secretary of State. What I am worried about is that the commissioner will have more to do with the Secretary of State and the overseeing of the Secretary of State's stewardship of the whole scheme than anyone else. Therefore, this is an issue on which it is worth testing the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 76D) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 155; Not-Contents, 138

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 77, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84. Amendment No. 77 clarifies that the National Identity Scheme Commissioner's jurisdiction includes keeping under review the arrangements for securing the confidentiality and integrity of information on the register as well as the arrangements for handling complaints. I listened very carefully to the concerns raised by noble Lords in Committee and I hope that this amendment goes some way towards addressing those concerns.
	Noble Lords were particularly concerned about complaints handling. As the amendment clarifies, the commissioner will have oversight of the complaints handling procedures and, no doubt, will include in his report any concerns that he or she might have about the way in which the agency is handling any complaints that it receives.
	As I said in Committee, nothing in the Bill would prevent the commissioner taking an interest in or making further inquiries about a specific complaint. What I do not think would be appropriate, however, is to give the commissioner a formal role in the investigation of complaints in general. Complaints handling will be a routine function that the new agency will need to fulfil, and I do not think it sensible for the commissioner to be responsible for dealing with every single complaint, however trivial. It would substantially change the nature of his role, which is, in essence, one of keeping the scheme, as a whole, under review.
	Amendment No. 77 will also require the commissioner to keep under review the arrangements for securing the confidentiality and integrity of information recorded in the register. As I have made clear, I was most attentive to the concerns raised by noble Lords in Committee, in particular those about the security and integrity of the information held on the register. It is clear from this amendment that the commissioner must have regard to that and will report on it.
	However, we do not accept that the commissioner should have a formal role in requests for data correction from individuals. As I have made clear, the operation of the register will need to comply with the Data Protection Act 1998. The duties of the Secretary of State as a data controller, the rights of the individual as a data subject and the powers of the Information Commissioner will all apply to the national identity register as they do to other databases. Where a person feels his data are being unfairly processed—for example, because they are inaccurate—he could approach the Information Commissioner, who has a power to impose enforcement notices on data controllers. There is also a right under the Data Protection Act 1998 to apply to the courts for rectification.
	Amendments Nos. 78 to 82 seek to modify government Amendment No. 77. These are essentially unnecessary drafting amendments; they would have no substantive effect on the remit of the commissioner.
	We discussed at length in Committee the question of whether "arrangements for using", under Clause 24(2)(c), would in this context include "uses". As I said then—and I stand by that view—it would. Therefore, Amendment No. 78, which adds the word "uses" into the government amendment clarifying the scope of Clause 24(2), is particularly inappropriate, as the word "uses"—as opposed to "arrangements for using"—does not appear in the subsection which is being clarified.
	Amendment No. 83 seeks to add to the powers of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner by allocating him a formal role in the investigation of individual complaints and in dealing with data corrections. I outlined in our discussion on Amendment No. 77 the reasons why that would not be appropriate. I therefore do not intend to repeat those comments now. Suffice it to say that the commissioner should scrutinise the agency's own complaints-handling procedures and report on those as he or she sees fit. Staff of the agency will be under a duty to co-operate with the commissioner and provide information to him by virtue of Clause 24(4). If the commissioner is not satisfied with the handling of complaints in general, or a complaint in particular, he can raise it with the Secretary of State and refer to it in his reports under Clause 25, all of which will be laid before Parliament.
	Amendment No. 83 also seeks to give the commissioner a role in data correction in individual cases. I have already outlined why we believe that this amendment is inappropriate and I do not intend to say more on that. Individuals will be able to check the details of their own entry on the register. We hope to make that possible by means of a secure online check. I know that noble Lords were concerned about how to ensure that the facility operates easily, smoothly and sensibly. We think that this proposal will be helpful. In any event, they will be able to make a written subject access request under the Data Protection Act.
	If individuals are concerned that there is an error on the register, they can request that the information is removed or corrected. In the normal course of events, the problem should be solved without the need for reliance on formal legal rights. Ultimately, however, as I indicated, an unreasonable failure to rectify information can be the subject of a formal application for rectification made to the courts under Section 14 of the Data Protection Act.
	Amendment No. 84 seeks to add to the remit of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner both general policy matters and areas that are currently excluded from his remit if any of those areas raises a matter of substantial public interest. The effect would be that the commissioner would have oversight of an excluded matter where a particular case raised a concern of substantial public interest.
	In Committee, I outlined why the matters set out in Clause 24(3) have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the commissioner: because they fall under the jurisdiction of other bodies, be it Parliament, the courts or a different statutory commissioner. I also gave a detailed account of why the matters contained within paragraphs (a) to (d) of Amendment No. 84 are not issues with which the commissioner should become involved. I do not propose to repeat those arguments as I am sure that all noble Lords opposite have had the opportunity to read them in detail; it was on 19 December 2005, at col. 1522.
	Amendment No. 84 would, additionally, give the commissioner oversight of "general policy matters". Our view is that it is unnecessary to include that in the Bill. The Secretary of State will be establishing the policy for the agency and the agency will implement that policy. The commissioner will be keeping under review the arrangements made by the agency, by designated documents authorities or those to whom information is provided. Nothing in the Bill prevents the commissioner from commenting on any policy matter in one of his reports. Indeed, we would expect him to do so. However, we are of the view that it is inappropriate to list in the Bill all matters which the commissioner may choose to look at, or comment on in his reports. To do that would make the legislation unnecessarily lengthy, and in our view that should be avoided.
	I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that the commissioner's remit is sufficiently wide to ensure that the scheme has the appropriate level of oversight and I would invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments. I absolutely understand noble Lords' concerns to ensure that the commissioner has comprehensive opportunities to make comment. We believe that the way in which we have drawn Amendment No.77 enables the commissioner to do everything which is proper. I therefore beg to move while inviting the noble Lords not to do so.

Lord Crickhowell: My Lords, when, on the sixth day in Committee, amendments were moved to ensure that the commissioner would review and report on the extent to which there were proper arrangements for securing the confidentiality and integrity of the information recorded in the register and that there were effective arrangements for dealing with complaints, the Minister argued, at col. 1519 of the Official Report, that it was not necessary to do so as the spirit of the amendments was already reflected in Clause 24 and because the existing complaints procedures were more than adequate. She has now taken a welcome step forward and her new Amendment No. 77 is certainly helpful.
	The Minister has argued that the amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, are largely drafting amendments and do not add very much. He said that they were improving amendments but did not pursue most of them with any great determination. I think that there is a rather stronger case to be made out for them. In our last debate on these issues, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed out that the commissioner's role was confined to considering structures and frameworks. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, tighten up the new subsection to ensure that the commissioner will not just examine appropriate provision but will consider whether the arrangements really are effective and work in practice.
	The issue of complaints had been raised by the Select Committee on the Constitution in paragraph 7 of its third report. The last time that we debated this matter, the Minister argued:
	"It would be wrong to give the commissioner a formal role in the investigation of complaints".
	She repeated that argument this afternoon. She then said that it would be a routine function that the new agency would need to fulfil and that the United Kingdom Passport Service already had a tried and tested system for dealing with complaints. On that occasion, she did not appear to recognise that the handling of complaints about the accuracy of the register and the uses to which it will be put is not at all the same as the handling of complaints about the manner in which passports are issued.
	The Minister went on to give us a description of what she believed was a satisfactory complaints procedure. She said:
	"There is an existing four-stage complaints procedure which includes a review by the local customer service manager, followed, if not satisfied, by a review by the headquarters' customer service department. If not satisfied, a complainant can write through their MP to the Passport Service chief executive or a Home Office Minister and then, as I have already said, to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration—the ombudsman".—[Official Report, 19/12/05; col. 1520.]
	Anyone who has had to deal with the so-called "customer service" organisation of any large body—as I have had to do recently—will know what a nightmare it can be. After a long session in which you are asked to key in various numbers on your telephone and a prolonged lecture—admittedly, usually imposed by some regulator—about your rights, you then listen for probably a quarter of hour, at your expense, while someone says that you are a customer and your custom is greatly valued. Eventually you get through, only to be moved on to someone else and to have to wait for another 22 minutes—as happened to me the other day—before you get connected. If the Minister had had the privilege which some of us have had of being a Member of Parliament and going through the procedures by which you pass on complaints to Ministers and the ombudsman, then I do not think that she would have read that part of Sir Humphrey's draft with quite the confidence she did on the last occasion. It seems a far from satisfactory set of arrangements.
	Amendment No. 83, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, will give the commissioner the responsibility of setting up a system for dealing with complaints that tailor the whole thing to the requirements of the register. It would not give the commissioner himself the job of dealing with detailed complaints. I agree with the Minister that that should not be his role.
	The final amendment in this group, Amendment No. 84, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, takes up the issue raised by the Minister on 19 December, at col. 1523, when she attempted to justify the fact that the Bill requires the commissioner's reports to be made to the Secretary of State and not to Parliament on the ground that the Secretary of State must have the right to exclude sensitive material concerning security and crime prevention.
	It is hard to see why that should be necessary if the commissioner is specifically precluded from keeping those matters under review, as he is by Clause 24(3). We understand perfectly well, however, why there needs to be a protecting mechanism, and our Amendment No. 84, which will be very relevant when we debate the next group of amendments, maintains the necessary safeguards but allows the commissioner to keep under review general policy matters, particularly issues of substantial public interest that may arise from particular cases without, of course, going into the details of those cases in a way that could prejudice security or crime prevention.
	That is a sensible way in which to proceed, and I hope that the House will agree.

Amendment No. 78, as an amendment to Amendment No. 77, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 79 to 82, as amendments to Amendment No. 77, not moved.]
	On Question, Amendment No. 77 agreed to.
	[Amendments Nos. 83 and 84 not moved.]
	Clause 25 [Reports by Commissioner]:

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, the concept of identity cards is so alien to British history—for several of us, it is extremely offensive—that I hope that eventually the legislation will be repealed and cast into the dustbin of history. It is therefore extremely difficult to trust a Secretary of State in an Administration that has had, and continues to have, such a cavalier attitude to our historic liberties, or to trust a government not to do what my noble friend Lord Crickhowell says they will do. As my noble friend says, it is Parliament—or should be—that defends our historic liberties. We should certainly trust Parliament more than the Executive, however supine it sometimes is in the face of the Executive. Therefore, on the basis of old-fashioned British liberty, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Crickhowell 100 per cent.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, as a former member of the other place, I should like to say a couple of words in support of the excellent amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell. The way in which Parliament is being ignored and sidelined is increasingly worrying to me and to many other people. The great benefit of this amendment is that it will introduce a concept that, in matters of such import as the identity card register or the identity card itself, the commissioner should be responsible through his report not to the Home Department but to Parliament. That is an altogether sensible proposition.
	The Government ought to show goodwill by accepting the amendment. In so doing, they may very well restore confidence in the belief that the Government continue to believe in Parliament as the true representative of the interests and freedoms of this country and not simply as the servant of the political party that happens to be in power for the time being.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 85) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 145; Not-Contents, 139

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: moved Amendment No. *85A:
	Page 22, line 28, leave out subsections (2) to (5) and insert—
	"( ) The Commissioner may also, at any time, lay before Parliament such other reports on any matter relating to the carrying out of those functions as the Commissioner thinks fit.
	( ) If it appears to the Commissioner, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that the publication of a particular matter contained in a report under this section would be prejudicial to—
	(a) national security, or
	(b) the prevention or detection of crime,
	the Commissioner must exclude that matter from the copy of the report that he lays before Parliament.
	( ) Where the Commissioner excludes from publication any matter under the provisions of this section, he must make a report on that matter to the Secretary of State."

The Earl of Northesk: My Lords, I apologise for having been unable to attend the last day in Committee just before Christmas, when this matter would have been debated. I therefore hope that your Lordships will forgive me for retabling both this and other amendments on Report. The amendment proposes the establishment of a technical advisory board to advise on a number of areas relating to the development of the national identity register. I express gratitude to my noble friend Lord Cope. I have, as it were, borrowed the text of the amendment from him. Although I have broadened its scope somewhat, the House may recognise it from a previous incarnation as an amendment that he made to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.
	The proposal is in part motivated by the recognition of the Constitution Committee of,
	"the desirability of creating an independent expert advisory or consultative committee or commission to exercise informed judgement regarding development of the National Identity Scheme".
	I can be certain that the Government will reject the amendment. As did the Minister earlier in our proceedings and in her helpful letter of 11 January—I thank her for it—she will list the various bodies that have been established to develop the scheme to fruition: the biometric advisory group, the Home Office's Biometrics Centre of Expertise, the biometrics assurance group and so on. Nevertheless, the Government have invested a great deal of political capital in this Bill. It is a key component of their legislative programme for this Parliament. It is not unreasonable to suggest that our scrutiny so far has exposed manifest flaws in the scheme, not least in respect of cost, technology, civil liberties and privacy.
	I make it clear that I do not in any way question the integrity or the expertise of the various bodies cited. Nevertheless, they are of necessity creations of government and, to that extent, their remit is rooted in the determination of the Home Office to enact this measure regardless. Quite apart from that, it is worth noting that, in making its recommendation, the Constitution Committee took due account of the bodies already established by the Government. It none the less felt the situation warranted the creation of an outside body to "exercise informed judgement". That is what the amendment would provide. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I am certainly grateful for the brevity of the contributions on this amendment. I shall endeavour to put over as effectively as I can our case in opposition to it. I have a strong sense of déjà vu, because it was I who had to deal with the proposal of a technical advisory board during our consideration of RIPA.
	The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seeks to establish an advisory board to offer advice on the development of the national identity scheme and to report annually to both Houses of Parliament. The board's membership would consist of representatives from the IT industry, biometrics specialists, law enforcement bodies and civil liberties groups. The last groups would have a particular interest in the privacy of the individual.
	As the noble Lord said, the amendment was tabled in Committee and was then withdrawn for understandable reasons. As agreed, we addressed the amendment in correspondence at the close of the Committee stage. The letter was copied to all noble Lords who had taken part in the various debates on the Bill. As we stated in that letter, this additional scrutiny of the scheme is neither warranted nor necessary. That is because there is already sufficient independent oversight of the scheme's development.
	In the first instance, the National Audit Office will provide an expert and thorough examination of the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme's use of public funds. This is the case for all government projects. However, the identity cards scheme will have several additional layers of scrutiny, as we detailed in our correspondence. For your Lordships' convenience, I will now repeat for the record exactly what we wrote.
	The Government's biometrics assurance group will be chaired by the Government's Chief Scientist. It will review the biometric aspects of the ID cards programme, in conjunction with the Home Office's Biometrics Centre of Expertise, led by the Chief Biometric Officer, Marek Rejman-Greene. All this will build on the work of the ID cards agency's own biometric advisers and their co-operation with other recognised biometric research institutes, such as the National Physical Laboratory. This group has already met and will meet quarterly throughout the year.
	Additionally, an independent assurance panel will look at project management, finance, procurement and the other aspects of the programme that are not covered by the biometrics assurance group. This panel, which meets monthly, is chaired by Mr Alan Hughes, a former chief executive of First Direct Bank. The chair of the independent assurance panel serves also as a non-executive member of the identity cards programme board. The IT infrastructure of the national identity register will also be put through an official security accreditation process, as laid out in Cabinet Office guidelines, before it can commence operations. Furthermore, this process will be followed by continuing audits of the register's IT security.
	The scheme's development is also scrutinised by the principal users group and private sector users group, which represent the interests of public and private sector organisations who will make use of the scheme. Consultations have taken place between the identity cards programme and special needs groups and we will continue these. Additionally, there is continuing dialogue between law enforcement agencies and the programme team to ensure that their requirements are considered as the scheme develops.
	Civil liberties and privacy groups have already taken part in the consultations, which took place on the scheme and on the draft Bill. In addition, the National Identity Scheme Commissioner will provide further scrutiny of the scheme, which will of course also be bound by data protection legislation and therefore comes under the jurisdiction of the Information Commissioner.
	I hope that your Lordships would agree that, taken together, those will provide a very great variety and depth of scrutiny. We believe that adding further layers would not add to the quality of scrutiny, but duplicate it and increase the levels and layers of bureaucracy. The technical advisory board is therefore unnecessary. I can reassure the noble Earl that the scheme will not be implemented unless the Government are sure that the technology is robust and effective.
	It is worth making a few comments about the comparison with the Technical Advisory Board established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. That board was created under the terms of the Act and is a very different creature from the board suggested in this amendment. The role of the board is very closely defined. It ensures that any technical or financial obligations placed on industry arising from an interception warrant are reasonable. A company can appeal to the board if it believes that this is not the case; to date the board has not had to consider a single case. The board does not provide general advice about the development of operations, based on the Act as a whole. Such general advice is obtained through the close consultation between the Home Office and the industry itself. The board is required neither to report to Parliament, nor to have its membership approved by Parliament.
	With the development of the independent assurance panel, the biometrics assurance group, consultations with public sector, private sector and special needs user groups, and the advice of the scheme commissioner, we believe we have put in place a comprehensive framework to ensure independent, wide-ranging and informed advice, which can be obtained to guide the development of the scheme in total. I reject the assertions made by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, that we are failing to address issues of cost or technology, or the development of the scheme as it unrolls. We have put in place many safeguards and structures to ensure that we have a structure and a number of bodies in place, which will enable us to consult extensively throughout the development of the identity cards programme. For those reasons, we reject this amendment and I invite the noble Earl to withdraw it.

The Earl of Northesk: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. As I made plain in my introduction to the amendment, I had anticipated the content of his response. To that extent my expectations have not in any way been disappointed. Our debates today have focused very firmly on the principle that oversight of the whole ID scheme should more properly reside with those who are truly independent of the Home Office and the rest of government. I have to continue to beg to differ with the noble Lord, given that so many uncertainties persist in respect of cost, technology and so on. To my mind it is necessary that the development of policy should also be subject to truly independent oversight. My intention is again to be of assistance to the Government. After all, the existence of a technical advisory board should pre-empt the possibility of the Home Office being inadvertently led down policy avenues that turn out to be technological dead ends or the like. Be that as it may, I shall carefully read the noble Lord's comments—even though I virtually wrote them for him in my introduction—and reflect on where I may yet wish to take this matter. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, for his opposition to Amendment No. 100. It is rare in this Bill that I have his company and I want to record my gratitude for it. I also want to record my gratitude for his sympathy and that of the noble Baroness—I experience joy on a daily basis in appearing before your Lordships and going through these Bills. Far be it from me to have that joy curtailed, but I understand that in future your Lordships may be denied the undoubtable pleasure of my company in that we will, I hope, have fewer Bills.
	Amendment No. 98 relates to the criminal offence of unauthorised disclosure of confidential information provided for in Clause 29. I understand what worries the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. I understand that she rightly says, "What about the person who, tired and worn down by the burdens of office, presses the right button or the wrong button? Will they be brought to book for it?" Perhaps I may reassure the noble Baroness in that regard. I tried to give such reassurance as fully as possible in my letter; I am more than happy to repeat during this debate what I said in the letter. It is our view that a person who, acting in good faith in the course of his job, accidentally made a disclosure could avail himself of the defence of reasonable belief. This would apply even if it was a physical error, such as accidentally pressing the wrong button. The person would reasonably have believed, at the time he made the error, that he was acting with lawful authority. That is the concern properly expressed by the noble Baroness, and we are very clear that such a person would be protected.
	Amendment No. 100 would remove from the Bill Clause 31 in its entirety. I understand that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, put the amendment forward because he would like me to repeat the reassurances I gave in the letter and I am more than happy to do so. This clause introduces the offence of causing an unauthorised modification to the register. There is a similar defence to that in Clause 29. It is a defence for a person to show that he believed, on reasonable grounds, that a modification was authorised.
	I am also aware that a number of trade unions are concerned about what would happen if lawful action was taken. I will therefore take this opportunity to mention two sets of circumstances which we do not consider fall within the remit of this offence. IT contractors who, in servicing government computers, made a mistake that resulted in computers crashing would not have committed this offence. Similarly, Clause 31 would not criminalise striking civil servants, on the grounds that their action might make it temporarily impossible to retrieve information. Subsection (3)(b) catches only action that makes it more difficult or impossible for information to be retrieved in a legible form. It is aimed at deliberate acts of sabotage or the introduction of viruses and so on and will not catch a simple withdrawal of labour.
	Noble Lords have expressed interest in the extent to which the provisions of the Computer Misuse Act already cover the offence of tampering with the national identity register. I know it is something that preys almost constantly on the mind of the noble Earl, Lord Northesk. The Computer Misuse Act contains a range of offences designed to cover all aspects of computer misuse; indeed, that Act will, as the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and the noble Baroness rightly indicated, be amended by the Police and Justice Bill in order to increase certain maximum penalties, and to respond to developments in cyber crime. The provisions of the Computer Misuse Act would apply to computer crime against the national identity register.
	Nevertheless, we felt it appropriate to create an offence of tampering, which relates specifically to the national identity register. Any computer crime against the register, which did not fall within the Clause 31 offence, could be dealt with under the wider provisions of the Computer Misuse Act. The Clause 31 offence attracts a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment and would apply even where the tampering was effected by someone working from a computer outside the United Kingdom. In saying that, I hope that I have given the noble Earl the reassurance he sought and have answered the question of the noble Baroness. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I rise to move a manuscript amendment lodged today, grouped with Amendments Nos. 105A and 105B. Perhaps I may very briefly recount the unhappiness that existed at Committee stage with the whole of the penalty regime—that is, Clauses 33 to 36. A whole host of amendments to those three clauses were put down at the Committee stage and a great deal of debate ensued. It is fair to say that the relative absence of amendments to those three clauses at Report stage reflects the fact that the Government gave us all considerable reassurance at Committee stage with the contents of their code. The code is going to govern the way the penalty provisions work.
	That, I think, is a fair statement of the background. My amendments are designed, first, to ensure that the code deals with one particular concern—the warnings sent to those who are subsequently to receive penalty notices. Secondly, they deal with the issue of consultation. I shall refer first to the question of warnings. Clause 36(1) sets out that the Secretary of State,
	"must issue a code of practice setting out the matters that he will consider when determining the amount to be imposed in any case by way of civil penalty under this Act".
	At Committee stage I made the point, which the Government did not seek to countermand, that this appears only to relate, and literally only relates, to the question of the amount of the penalty. In discussions afterwards I think there was acceptance that we needed to broaden the language of Clause 36(1) to make quite clear that the code of practice is concerned not only with the amount of the penalties but with the whole of the penalty regime in Clauses 33 to 35. Amendment 105A adds the words,
	"the manner of proceeding under sections 33 to 35",
	alongside the issue of determining the amount of a penalty.
	The amendment I put down this morning seeks to ensure that the warning given to those who have transgressed the ID regime is clearly part of Clause 36 and the manner of proceeding. I think I am right in saying that there is no reference anywhere in Clauses 33 to 36 to warning. There is of course long mention of notices of penalty, of appeals against penalty, and so on, but I am particularly concerned about the issue of warning. All those who spoke in Committee were anxious to ensure that the authorities would not impose a penalty until they had given the person against whom the penalty was to be imposed the chance to say what went wrong. Did they fall ill? Did they miss the bus? Is it wrong to say that they did not tip up at the place appointed and give their samples, or whatever else? In effect, it would ensure that the officials who have the task of arriving at the correct penalty do so with knowledge of the relevant facts; i.e. that the penalty should not be imposed before the explanation has been heard. Those who spoke in Committee felt that it was not good enough simply to say that there was a right of appeal. People do not want to have to make an appeal where no penalty should have been imposed. Again, it is fair to say that Ministers—I believe that it was the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who dealt with this matter—were not in any way opposed to the common sense of what was then being advanced.
	Manuscript Amendment No. 101A simply inserts a reference to the warning into Clause 33, so that it must be within the purview of Amendment No. 105A. The final amendment, Amendment No. 105B, deals with consultation and says:
	"Before the draft code is laid under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must consult with members of the public likely to be affected by the code".
	If one looks in Clause 17(5), which deals with checks to be made on the register by public authorities, one finds a comparable consultation provision.
	I submit that there is no more sensitive and important aspect of the Bill than the code of practice. It is our reassurance, on these Benches, that the absence of a great deal of the mechanics of the penalties in the Bill is something that we can wear, given a full and fair code of practice. It follows that, if that is correct, it is as important to have public consultation over the code as any other part of the Bill. I shall leave it at that. I beg to move.

Lord Selsdon: My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to move this amendment in this, the 100th anniversary of the Labour Party. I was sorry not to be invited to that great occasion, but I wonder, as history passes by, whether this legislation will be deemed to be groundbreaking or backbreaking. As I said to the Minister the other night, I think we are all on the same side, but we are all confused from different levels. I believe that people in this country accept the value of an identity card. Having accepted that, it is only a question of what identity card, and for what purpose. This is effectively the purpose of my amendment.
	I moved a similar amendment before, and withdrew. I also moved an amendment where there was a certain bit of confusion, but I wish to go back and say that the Minister and I start from opposing sides of the world. I start from the ultimate proof of identity—the passport. Having asked her if she would reconfirm the Answer I have had before to a Written Question, I would like to read it out:
	"The United Kingdom Passport Service, an executive agency of the Home Office, issues passports to British nationals in the UK. British passports are issued at the discretion of the Secretary of State by exercise of Royal prerogative, in line with the British Nationality Acts. A passport is issued only after an applicant's nationality status and identity has been confirmed, and is accepted throughout the world as proof of these".—[Official Report, 22/6/04; cols. WA 121–22.]
	The passport, therefore, is the ultimate identity card. There is no stronger identity card, none more valued, and it should not be replaced.
	We came afterwards to a certain little argument about what words should appear, and what name. I moved an amendment, which I withdrew, that the name should be as recorded in his passport, or in the form required for a passport. At that time, the noble Baroness did not quite agree with us and there was a rather amusing debate when we all accepted that none of our names would qualify.
	I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, as the other day I made a mistake. I was overwhelmed and forgot my lines. I called him "the noble Lord, Lord Swindon". In 18 of the 22 countries of the EEA, his last name is Swindon and, therefore, that is his last name. He pointed out in the debate that he was sometimes known as "Lord Stod of Swin". I am an "of" but the last bit of my name—"Croydon", of which, being a Scot, I am not desperately proud—does not appear in my passport because it is not a registered name. We went through some confusion, but the noble Baroness satisfied us in one of her notes—I was the only one in the Chamber who received it—which said that they were asking for the name that individuals are known by for all purposes, which is what applies when one goes for a passport. Without my having to move an amendment or to press it, the noble Baroness has quietly, surreptitiously and kindly answered my question. We have accepted that the passport is the ultimate proof of identity and that one's name will be as in one's passport. If that is the ultimate identity card, why do we need the Bill at all? If we started from the viewpoint that the identity card was the passport, we might not need it.
	Secondly, the amendment says that,
	"the United Kingdom Passport Service should issue upon request to any British passport holder an identity card"
	which will come anyway. It may be called a biometric identity card, but it will go with the passport. I then put in brackets "British National Identity Card" because that is how it should be known. If it is the ultimate identity card and it is proof of your nationality as a British national, why not call it the British national identity card?
	I also asked the Minister about all these foreigners who come over here. How will we know who they are? Surely they should have their nationalities on their identity card. The noble Baroness said:
	"I thank the noble Lord. The truth is that EU citizens do not have to surrender their own national cards when they come here. However, they will be eligible for a UK card if they are resident here, but it will not show nationality".—[Official Report, 15/11/05; col. 1008.]
	Anyone who does not have a British national identity card is a foreigner. I believe that we are keener to identify foreigners with identity cards than ourselves. However, that leads to even more confusion. I tried to push the Baroness gently at the time and asked whether there would be more than one identity card. She said, "No". I shall not quote her, as I cannot remember the column number and I shall lose my place in my papers. She said that there would be only one identity card. So I moved an amendment saying, "Let's make sure that we could not have more than one". Then she kindly said, "No, you can't do that because we might have to have more than one". There was then a flurry of feathers in the Home Office hen coop, and bits of paper came rushing across. The noble Baroness said, "Yes, there will be lots of identity cards effectively", and she even used the words "et cetera".
	It does not really matter if we have lots of identity cards, but it may have an impact on costs. The passport is the ultimate identity card and, to go with the passport, I hope, will be the British national identity card, which will enable us to travel within 22 or so states. The noble Baroness also pointed out that there were reasons for having the card because, effectively, it would be a travel card rather than an identity card. I suggest that it is an identity card, part of whose purpose is for travel. So that it may go on the record, I point out that the 22 countries that have identity cards for travel at the moment are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland. There is no reason why the United Kingdom should not join that happy band of bedfellows. However, in many cases their identity cards and the data for them come from their passports, but there are problems when it comes to biometrics. The Germans do not want biometrics in any way. We will have biometrics, but if we have only two fingers that will take up two-thirds of the cost of the card, and there may be problems. I would like to ask the Minister—I may put down a Written Question—whether she could set out the conditions and data on each of the identity cards of the 22 states so that we can see how they are different. There is no point in us demanding more than is necessary to travel to those countries if that is one of the purposes of the British national identity card.
	I now come to the important question of the proof of identity. If the passport is the ultimate, then the British national identity card will come second and everything else comes third. In response to a Written Question from me, the Government kindly wrote back that the Department for Work and Pensions accepted 22 different pieces of paper for proof of identity. So the first thing in addition to the British national identity card is that there should be an identity card that is related solely to applications to the Department for Work and Pensions team for grants. That may be a slightly different one and of a different colour.
	Of course, other identity cards are issued at the moment to officials of government and the third identity card that I want to suggest is the name, rank and number card. Any official of government who has a right to demand information or to enter people's premises should have his own identity card with his name, rank and number on it and should present it when he comes to people's premises. That is not a complicated issue.
	Then we come to another point. It is right and reasonable that those of us who are entitled to benefits after a certain age—retirement age—whether it be the winter fuel allowance or pensions or bus passes or others, should have an identity card that prevents us from having to run around producing other pieces of paper to prove a known fact.
	I do not think that there is any need for a restriction on the different types of card that may be issued, but I have a problem with the register. On most occasions when one presents an identity card, no one will have a reader, so the only method of identification will be the visual information on the front of it. It will matter not what biometric data are on it. In recent readings on the Continent, 30 per cent of the biometric data readings for a face failed to recognise it. I refer back to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who, when I asked whether the card would have one's sex on it, said that proof of identity would be the photograph. I found in the research that I did recently that almost two out of three women to whom I spoke had changed their hair colour and the shape of their head and recognition was quite difficult. Even when one walks around the Bishops' Bar, I have found it difficult to identify people from the photograph hanging from their neck.
	If people wish to prove their identity—that is where I am coming from—they must have something that they can present that enables people to recognise them or to check who they are. That is not a particularly difficult exercise. I do not intend to press the amendment, but, if we start with the passport and accept that that is the ultimate proof of identity, all other pieces of paper or plastic cards are, effectively, secondary. When I asked the noble Baroness whether I could have everything on my card—I would like everything that is on the identity register to be on my card—she said that I could not. A driving licence is not really proof of identity, but it is accepted by some people as proof of identity. If on your British national identity card you do not have your driving licence data, there is no method of proving with that card that you have the ability or the right to drive, particularly if you are travelling internationally. As your Lordships know, the British driving licence is not really accepted as proof of identity for car hire in many places, because it does not have the secondary piece of paper containing any points that you may have run up through bad behaviour.
	I become more and more confused by this. The Minister says that we can have only one identity card and now we may have two but only in certain circumstances, preferably when we are bisexual or something like that. Can she not admit that we might be able to have all sorts of identity cards that could replace some of the other requirements to prove who we are? When we come to nationality, there is no reason at all why the card should not have certain extra bits on it; for example, the Welsh might have a Welsh card and the Scots a Scots card. There is no difficulty at all. When we come to the private sector, however, the only acceptable proof of identity in the banking sector in many parts of the world tends to be the original of your passport or a certified copy of it. As we have suggested that the identity card will help people with the commercial or private sectors, I would like to know how and where. Ultimately, some of the rules still say, under the banking regulations, "know thy customer". Even more under the new banking legislation, you have a duty to probe and push as far as you can. Those institutions will not have access to the identity register.
	I am not flying kites or chasing hares. I am simply asking what the maximum number of identity cards that we might have in issue is and whether more identity cards will cost more than one. I beg to move.

Lord Selsdon: My Lords, I cannot agree with the latter hedging by the Minister. If the passport is the ultimate identity card and thus what I call the "British National Identity Card", which the Minister calls a travel card, and is accepted as proof of identity by all government departments, it might be well be so accepted by anyone else.
	We must separate ourselves, as British nationals, from foreigners. That is not because I am trying to be too simple, but because if we do that, we need not go through all this great expense. The point is that, at present, it would cost only £10 to produce an identity card to go with the passport. As the Minister rightly says, 80 per cent of people in this country hold a passport, yet the proportion is higher among lower ages. In the older groups, only 50 per cent have a passport, as they do not need them and may never travel.
	I do not see why we cannot accept the concept of sticking to what the Minister calls a travel card. Instead of calling it that, we just call it a "British National Identity Card" based on the passport and encourage everybody to go the passport route. As little information will be contained on that identity card, the identity register is a separate issue. It may be needed at some time in future for other purposes than to prove who you are.
	I am not being controversial, but I must also quote the Minister to correct something. On 23 January, she said:
	"I also tried to draw a distinction between the different types of cards that will be available. There will be the standard identity card for British citizens issued alongside a British passport"—
	that is what I call the "British National Identity Card"—
	"That will have on its face certain clear information about the identity of the person et cetera".
	Here we have that spelt out in full:
	"It will be very clear that this is the travel document"—
	I would say: "No, this is the identity card"—
	"There will then be a stand-alone identity card for those who do not want a passport but who want to travel within Europe"—
	which is no identity card but a travel card—
	"Then there will be the plain card, which will not be valid for travel. You will clearly be able to differentiate one from the other. Then there are ID cards which are linked to residence permits and other immigration documents issued to foreign nationals".—[Official Report, 23/1/06; cols. 1009–1010.]
	That seems like lots of cards to me. Maybe it is not, but I suggest that the Minister incorporates in the Bill a requirement that every official of government should have their own identity card, to prove their identity to non-officials. When someone turns up and shows their card, we have no idea whether it is true or a forgery or whatever.
	I will push this no further at present, but I have made a point as strongly as I can. The rest of the Bill—the identity card register—is a complete and utter waste of time and money and causes too much emotional stress. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: My Lords, this is the same amendment that my noble friend Lady Anelay moved in Committee on 12 December 2005, reported at cols 1098 to 1099 of Hansard. The debate did not finish until eighteen minutes past midnight, when we were all in a state of some confusion but had been promised a clarifying letter from the Minister. I shall return to that.
	The amendment would give Parliament—the House of Commons and your Lordships' House—sole power over any UK ID card system and to prevent the Government from signing us up to any EU system without Parliament's explicit consent. The burden of my song in Committee was that I feared that Parliament had already lost the power to give effect to the amendment, even if it were passed. I pointed out that Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community—the TEC—which covers,
	"Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies Related to the Free Movement of Persons"
	was introduced at Amsterdam under unanimity. That means that we could veto measures introduced under it. However, by a unanimous Council decision in December 2004, the voting system on measures introduced under Title IV, except for legal immigration, was changed from unanimity to qualified majority voting, under Article 251 of the treaty.
	I then suggested that work being done in Brussels under the so-called Hague programme indicated that the Commission was moving towards proposing an EU-wide ID system, starting with minimum standards for each member state. For the record, I should mention that I omitted to mention a protocol at the back of the TEC. Protocol 4, on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, was inserted at Amsterdam and gave the UK an opt-out from Title I—even if the other member states voted unanimously to change its decision-making procedure from unanimity to QMV, which they duly did. However, Article 3 of the protocol gives the UK and Ireland the power to opt in to any proposal under Title IV in which they wish to participate. Any such participation would now be by QMV except for proposals about legal immigration, which remain under unanimity.
	It is here that the plot thickens, in the shape of Council decision 15226/04 of 15 December 2004, a copy of which I shall place in your Lordships' Library. Paragraph (13) of that decision says that,
	"In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland . . . those Member States"—
	the United Kingdom and Ireland—
	"have notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Decision".
	So, it is pretty clear that we have opted into decision 15226/04, but what does that say? Paragraph (6) says that,
	"the Council is required to act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251"—
	in other words, qualified majority voting—
	"when adopting, in conformity with the case law of the Court of Justice relating to the choice of legal basis for Community acts, the measures referred to in Article 62 . . . (2)(a)"
	of the TEC. Other articles are mentioned; I do not need to trouble your Lordships with them to show where the labyrinth leads us.
	I trust that it is now clear that the United Kingdom has opted into Council decision 15226/04 and that we are therefore bound to accept any qualified majority vote in the Council for measures brought under Article 62(2) of the TEC. That article, under Title IV, covers,
	"measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member States which shall establish . . . standards and procedures to be followed by Member States in carrying out checks on persons at such borders".
	It is pretty clear that an EU identity card system could be sanctioned by those words. The Minister may say something along the lines of what she said in Committee: that ID cards are not specifically mentioned as a measure covered under Article 62(2)(a), but the decision I quoted rubs in the fact that the Luxembourg court—that engine of EU integration—will alone rule on the decision's legal justification, as is always the case. When the Government have admitted more than once in Written Answers that Brussels is using Article 308 of the TEC, which sanctions measures only in pursuit of the objectives of the Common Market, as the legal justification for the EU's entire fundamental rights programme, how can they pretend that Article 62(2)(a) could not give rise to an EU ID card system?
	I have two brief, simple questions for the Minister, but before putting them, perhaps I should comment as kindly as I can on her letter to me of 10 January, following our debate on 12 December. In her first paragraph, she claims generically that:
	"There is no question of ID cards being introduced by fiat from Brussels".
	She also says:
	"The introduction of ID cards is entirely a matter for the UK Parliament to decide".
	Noble Lords should note that quotation. The Minister assures us that Parliament will have the final say, not the Government in the secret conclaves of Brussels. I fear that those statements will turn out to be wishful thinking. The Minister then goes on:
	"I should like to respond to what you say about Title IV of the EC treaty. Title IV is primarily concerned with border controls and the entry and residence of third country nationals in the community. It does not provide for the introduction of a European Union ID card".
	True, oh Queen, as such. But my contention is that it is wide enough to do so and that it will.
	The Minister goes on:
	"In addition, the UK is only bound by measures drawn up under Title IV if it opts into them".
	That may be true under the terms of Protocol IV, as I have mentioned, but I trust that I have shown that the UK has indeed opted into the measures to be decided by qualified majority voting under Council Decision 15226/04 and several others. I could quote clauses out of the transport section of the treaty that would do just as well, but let us use that one for the moment.
	So my first question to the Minister is: are the Government saying that Decision 15226/04 could not—even with the eventual support of the Luxembourg court, against whose decision there is no appeal—be used to introduce an EU ID card system under Article 62(2)(a) or other articles in the treaty? If that is their position, I must ask them to explain the treaty basis for it. Why do they believe that that is the position when the treaty appears to say otherwise? Secondly, if the Government support the Minister when she says in her letter that the introduction of ID cards in the UK will be entirely a matter for Parliament to decide, why do they not accept the amendment and particularly subsection (3) thereof. If the Government mean what the Minister said, surely they must undertake that they, the Executive, will not opt in to any future proposal in Brussels that could lead to an EU scheme being imposed on us, if they have not already done so—I fear they have. If the Government will not accept the amendment, will they at least give that undertaking, and if not, why not?
	I am sorry to have spent so much time on this amendment, but I have done so to show how entwined we already are in the tentacles of Brussels on the issue of identity cards, as, indeed, we now are for the majority of our national legislation. Noble Lords will remember that before the last general election, Michael Howard said that in the event of victory the Conservatives would make changes to our systems of dealing with asylum and illegal immigration, only to be told by the EU Commission that he was out of order and that the UK Government were not longer free to do so, having ceded control of those areas under Title IV of the TEC and subsequent Council decisions. It is the same picture that we are looking at today.
	Those appear to be the waters through which we are now navigating, and I do not see why this situation should be much different. I do not pretend to have understood the whole picture, which is unusually complex, perhaps deliberately so. But I am reasonably sure of one thing: if we stay in the European Union, the United Kingdom will end up as part of an EU ID card system, controlled eventually by Brussels, and there will be nothing that this Parliament, as opposed to the government of the day, will have been able to do about it. In the mean time, I look forward to the Minister's reply to the questions I have put to her, in the hope that her answers may help to stave off the fate that, I fear, otherwise awaits us. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, for outlining with his usual clarity why he feels that there should be anxiety—nay, alarm—about the current position. I am not at all surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, says that it does not really matter what we say, he will never be reassured anyway. With that as a background, I shall clarify the position as best I can.
	The noble Lord, Lord Pearson, probably already knows the answers that I will give, but I will give them for the record. When the noble Lord last spoke on this matter, he focused on the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. His comments in that regard were coloured a little by his failure to differentiate between the arrangements proposed in the constitution, which was not proceeded with, and the prevailing situation.
	Amendment No. 111A seeks to state in primary legislation that it is for Parliament to decide whether an identity card scheme, be it voluntary or compulsory, should be introduced into the UK. The amendment makes similar statements on who should be required to possess an ID card and the security standards required for both the ID card and the register.
	I hardly need to say it, but Parliament is sovereign. Unless and until primary legislation concerning ID cards is brought before this Parliament, there will be no ID cards scheme in the United Kingdom. This Bill is that primary legislation. We have debates on whether the scheme should be compulsory or voluntary, but there is no debate that this Bill will bring in the ID cards scheme if this Parliament determines that that should occur. It is strange and, if I may respectfully say so, unnecessary to state in a Bill that is before Parliament the fact that Parliament is sovereign over the subject matter to which the Bill relates.
	Although Parliament will prescribe, by way of affirmative order, the information to be recorded on ID cards and the format of that information, the security standards of ID cards and of the register will not be set out in legislation. It would be inappropriate to release details of the security standards required for ID cards or the register into the public domain. I hope that noble Lords will concur with the reasons for that. To do so may compromise the future security and integrity of the register itself, giving potential wrongdoers a good place to start when looking for ways to attack the register.
	Subsection (2) of the amendment seeks to prevent any international body imposing conditions on any UK citizen to attend any place for the purpose of the issue of an identity card unless this has been agreed to by a UK statute. Subsection (3) of the amendment seeks to prevent any Minister entering into an undertaking with the EU to introduce an ID card scheme in the UK, or agreeing any common standards in relation to such a scheme, unless Royal Assent has been given to the Identity Cards Bill or any other statute for that specific purpose.
	As I stated on previous occasions, and more recently in my letter of 10 January—which has been quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch—the Government's position is that there is no question of identity cards being introduced by fiat from Brussels. We very much doubt, as the noble Lord has set out from my letter, that the treaties could provide a legal basis for so doing. Even if—which once again we doubt—it could be argued that Title 4 could provide a treaty base, the United Kingdom would be bound by such a measure only if it opted into it. Notwithstanding what the noble Lord has said in relation to that, I think that even he accepts that we would have to opt in in order for it to apply. He, of course, says that we may be minded at some stage to do so. But there is no indication of that and, unless and until we opt in, we would not be so bound. In any event, in so far as there is any scope for making such arguments, restating parliamentary sovereignty in the Bill does not change the position. I hope that I have been able to assure noble Lords about that.
	Mention has been made of the EU measures on ID cards which were entered into in December. The conclusion adopted at the Justice and Home Affairs Council was an intergovernmental measure which is not legally binding. It sets out some common principles which all member states agreed were important for the security and issuance of ID cards. Noble Lords will know, as the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, has made clear, that 22 countries in the EU currently have ID cards. Their citizens use those ID cards to come to this country. It is in our interests to make sure that the provisions which apply to ID cards are secure and safe for those who come to this country because we have to rely on the integrity of their documents because they are the ones they choose to use.
	This was requested by the Hague programme and the July 2005 Justice and Home Affairs Council because national ID cards are acknowledged to be the least secure of the identity and travel documents which are commonly used in the EU. It is in the interests of all of us that ID cards are as secure as possible. The council conclusions do not and cannot impose any obligation on states to introduce ID cards if they do not already have them. That is the case, for instance, in Latvia, Denmark and Ireland as well as the United Kingdom.
	I absolutely understand the concerns of the noble Lords, Lord Pearson of Rannoch and the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart—who remain resolutely Euro sceptic—but I have to tell your Lordships, as clearly as I can, that they are unfounded. It will be this Parliament which determines whether ID cards will be introduced; it will be this Parliament which decides the conditions which apply; and it will be this Parliament which says yea or nay to their introduction—and no other.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 114A to which I have added my name. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, for tabling it. It was a very crafty move to have this debate at this stage of the Bill, particularly for me, as it means that I can ask questions that were central to my Amendment No. 45 that I did not move on day two of Report because of time considerations. That is flannel for saying that I was trying to get to a vote at the right time.
	I did not move the amendment then. I apologised to the Royal National Institute for the Blind and said that I would ensure that I found a way of raising the issues, if only by bringing the matter back on Third Reading. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, has made sure that I do not need to go to Third Reading but can dispose of matters today. I have, therefore, given advance notice of my questions to the Government in the hope that all will be resolved.
	In Committee on 12 December (at cols. 1052 to 1058 of the Official Report) I signalled my concern about the burdens that could be imposed on disabled and vulnerable people as a result of the process that they will have to follow and the Clause 5 issues, to which the noble Lord, Lord Phillips referred—being enrolled on the national identity register. I said that I would refer back to the RNIB to ask whether the Minister's response had fully satisfied it on its concerns. I did just that, but the institute felt that it would be helpful if the Minister could give some further clarification.
	First, will the Minister establish who is eligible for enrolment in the ID cards scheme at home or through a mobile enrolment centre as a result of being unable to travel independently to an enrolment centre? In Committee on 12 December (at col. 1055 of the Official Report) the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton said that disabled and older people who were unable because of their impairment to travel to an enrolment centre could enrol for the ID cards scheme through a home visit or a mobile enrolment centre.
	RNIB said that that was a welcome statement of the general provision that the Government envisage as being necessary to meet the needs of older and disabled people who are unable to travel independently to an enrolment centre. However, the Minister also stated that,
	"it is planned that no person should have to travel any further than an hour from their home . . . This approach is in line with existing policy for similar requirements; for example, appointments for the Department for Work and Pensions. Additionally, for remote communities and those with mobility problems, mobile enrolment solutions as well as home visits are being considered".—[Official Report, 12/12/05; col. 1032.]
	I am concerned that an hour represents a significant length of journey, especially for an older or disabled person. Therefore, I welcome any additional detail that the Minister can give regarding whether the Government plan to establish eligibility criteria for home or mobile registration, setting out who will qualify for those services, which he said are being considered for older and disabled people. For example, will eligibility for those registration options be restricted to those disabled people who claim disability living allowance or attendance allowance, or will older and disabled people be able to request a home registration appointment without having to produce evidence that they have an impairment that makes it impossible or unreasonably difficult to travel up to an hour to a registration centre? If eligibility criteria are to be used in determining who will qualify for home or mobile registration, we are keen to know what those criteria will be, in case they unreasonably restrict assistance and force some older or disabled people to travel up to an hour to an enrolment centre.
	Because these are somewhat detailed issues, I gave advance notice. I hope that the Minister can clarify matters today.

Baroness Byford: I thank the Minister for coming back. I think it was about seven o'clock that night. It was certainly late when we started. I cannot remember; it is a minor point. We had virtually three hours' work

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: I thank the noble Baroness for giving way. I agree with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, about the unsatisfactory timing. I understand that the length of debates is not always within the Government's control. However, through the usual channels, they can control when matters are timetabled. I believe I am correct in saying that for two more Committee days this Bill is timetabled after other Bills. It is really unsatisfactory for the flow of the Bill in Committee to have only an hour and a quarter before we stop again. It is difficult to get into the flow if this is how we are to deal with it every day. I want to register the opinion of those on these Benches in that respect. I also want to put on record that, when a Bill is pushed further and further back and points take a long time, noble Lords want to make substantial contributions at Committee stage and question the Minister, there is a tendency to feel that they should hurry because of time constraints. That is not acceptable at Committee stage.

Earl Peel: I shall speak to Amendment No. 116, which stands in my name and is grouped with Amendment No. 111.
	Inadvertently, I failed to declare an interest when I first spoke in Committee the other day. I own land in the north of England, mostly moorland and mostly subject to agricultural tenancies.
	I apologise if it will take a little longer at this late hour, but I need to explain to your Lordships exactly what I am trying to achieve. Amendment No. 116 would put a statutory obligation on Natural England to address the UK's obligations on the sustainable use of natural resources under the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. I am sure the Minister will point out that, under Clause 40, there is an obligation for government departments to have regard to the convention. Clearly, that is not the same as having a statutory obligation to abide by it. If Natural England is to wholeheartedly commit itself to sustainable management of wildlife resources—that is the important phrase—then an adherence to the convention should be mandatory. Furthermore, it could probably be argued that, by failing to support the principles behind the convention, the Government run the risk of undermining the internationally agreed conservation goal of sustainable use, and even appearing to condone the non-sustainable use of such resources.
	Without going into the convention in too much detail, there are one or two key issues on which I shall focus. As a general point, wildlife legislation has tended to concentrate too much on a purely protectionist stance. We need to move to a more positive position, whereby active conservation becomes more prevalent and reflects more realistically the principles of sustainable use.
	My amendment specifically refers to Article 6 of the convention. However, the wording of that article is such that it covers the measures set out in the convention as a whole. It would therefore include an obligation under Article 10, for example, to,
	"support local populations"—
	when I talk about "local", I mean "human"—
	"to develop and implement remedial action in degraded areas where biological diversity has been reduced",
	and,
	"encourage co-operation between its governmental authorities and its private sector in developing methods for sustainable use of biological resources".
	There is a greater need for government and their agencies to appreciate the role that the private sector can and, indeed, does play in enhancing biodiversity objectives and to work more closely toward that aim. To that end, article 8 includes the objective to,
	"respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovation and practices of indigenous and local communities".
	That, again, reflects the fact that local experience and wisdom should be harnessed more effectively to obtain common objectives in wildlife management.
	I recognise that the UK Government have started down the road with their biodiversity action plans for species of conservation concern, but they are not quite as effective as they might be. Their approach is, if I may use the term, rather bland. Furthermore, conservation organisations such as the wildlife trusts and the RSPB have been channelling funds for specific conservation via their nature reserves—whereby the public pay in return for access—which has resulted in positive examples of wildlife management. One good example is the successful osprey breeding programme at Loch Garten.
	A further example of such sustainable wildlife benefits comes indirectly—and here I declare an interest—from grouse moors management. I apologise to those of your Lordships who may have heard me mention these statistics before in debate on the Commons Bill, but they are very important. On the managed moors of the north Pennines, we have in the region of 3,900 pairs of curlew whereas, elsewhere, their numbers appear to be quite unsustainable. Indeed, in the Berwyn SPA in Wales, the number is down to a mere 35 pairs.
	Similarly, golden plover populations on the two Pennine SPAs amount to some 2,150 pairs—in areas managed for grouse—whereas the population in the whole of Wales appears now to have slumped to a mere 85 pairs. That clearly represents a non-sustainable management regime. Positive management is required to try and rectify those ever falling wader populations. A similar report has been produced on Dartmoor, where the golden plover and green plover populations are literally falling out of bed. If that continues along current lines, they will cease to exist there, so positive management is required.
	This amendment is not simply about conserving biodiversity: it promotes the sustainable use of biodiversity via active species management. All wildlife in this country owes its position to man's involvement, and wildlife management must be seen as part of our conservation effort, not separate from it. I should add that that would include flora as well as fauna. One clear example; if we want to encourage bluebells into woodlands it requires a certain type of woodland management through coppicing which would, again, require the careful management of deer.
	There is a real need for more pragmatic and positive moves toward sustainable wildlife objectives, involving all parties in a more constructive dialogue and a realistic approach. This amendment, which simply incorporates into law the United Nations convention on the sustainable use of biodiversity, would go some way toward meeting those objectives. In the parliamentary briefing for the Bill, the three organisations that will form part of Natural England stated that they want to achieve,
	"a clear general purpose that should be enabling rather than prescriptive, inclusive rather than narrow and forward-looking rather than retrospective".
	I suggest that this amendment would greatly enhance the prospects of such objectives being achieved. To do its job effectively, Natural England should have a statutory duty to develop wildlife policies that are sustainable in the long term. That has to embrace positive wildlife management, which must include the word "use". That is crucial.

Lord Greenway: I sat through our proceedings last week, and was not certain when to make these remarks, which are more general and refer in fact to all these amendments to Clause 2.
	The Minister said in his opening remarks on Clause 2 that the list of activities that fell within the general purpose of the Bill were not necessarily set in stone, but I believe that he also said—I cannot remember his exact words—that the Government had looked at these different interest areas very carefully indeed. I am concerned that the amendments risk upsetting the necessary balance which stems from giving equal weighting to conservation and biodiversity on the one hand and access and recreation on the other and which provides a basis for harmonious working between those different areas.
	Work is already been done by the various interest groups, and I shall briefly cite a couple of examples. The Central Council of Physical Recreation is working with English Nature and the Countryside Agency on the Best of Both Worlds project, and the Royal Yachting Association and the British Marine Federation have their Green Blue initiative. The latter includes a strong education element—that is, educating both the boating public and the industry in best environmental practice. It also flags up current examples of good practice and, in addition, provides a useful index of all academic and professional studies on boating and the environment, something from which all sides could gain benefit.
	I hope that Natural England will embrace these existing projects and ensure that such co-operation continues and, indeed, is built on. As the Minister has said already, the board of Natural England will be quite capable of deciding any contentious matters without its hands being tied by weighting towards any particular interest area in this section of the Bill.
	I make these remarks now because I am conscious that time is moving on. I will not be able to be here when the Committee meets next Wednesday. Therefore, for the reasons I have just mentioned, I should also like to oppose now the inclusion of the Sandford principle in the Bill, in Amendment No. 122. I do not know whether we will reach that amendment today.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: In view of the hour, I shall do my best to be very brief. I declare the same interests as I declared at Second Reading in connection with specific wildlife trusts. I also serve as an officer of the all-party group on the matters with which this group of amendments is concerned.
	I declare not so much an interest as, in the light of the speech of my noble friend Lord Peel on his own amendment, a potential appearance on a charge sheet. My noble friend commented on past legislation. I should confess to the Committee that I served as the government Whip on the 1981 Bill. The Committee sat for 105 hours. It was not guillotined in any way and was staffed, on both sides, by MPs who were passionate about the subject. The principal Ministers on the Bill were my noble friends Lord King of Bridgwater and Lord Monro of Langholm. I would simply defend the enthusiasts who staffed both sides of the Committee. They were inevitably representative of that era in the views that they expressed but there was no question at all about the degree of commitment which they showed to the subject.
	I have taken an interest in more wildlife trusts than those where I have been resident or have represented as an elected representative in the other place. I am greatly encouraged by their advance across the country in the manner described by my noble friend Lord Peel. As a future mover of an amendment on Clause 40, to which he also referred, I strongly support my noble friend in his salience on these matters much earlier in the Bill.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton: Perhaps I may deal first with the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and the issue supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Byford. Natural environment and biodiversity do include marine. Natural England will be a key player in the new Marine Bill discussions, and it is too early yet to know how those discussions will conclude.
	Perhaps I may deal first with "enhance". For the past 40 years, the Countryside Agency has had programmes aimed at enhancing the landscape to improve people's quality of life. There have been popular programmes valued by both local communities and visitors, including, for example, the 12 community forests and the National Forest—an area which the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, and I know well. Nor is "enhancing" restricted to improving the quality of all the worst landscapes. The Countryside Agency took the lead in developing the Thames Landscape Strategy for London, aimed at restoring and enhancing one of the most spectacular metropolitan landscapes in Europe. We do want to see Natural England continue to innovate in this area. We accept that the amendment would not rule that out as the word "enhance" remains in Clause 2(1), but we want to ensure that the staff and customers of Natural England understand that this work will continue—in a way to be decided by the board.
	With regard to the issue of protecting, Natural England will be able to protect landscapes. The word "conserved" in the general purpose includes protection. Since the founding legislation of the Countryside Commission in 1968, the word "conserve" has been applied to landscape. References in existing landscape legislation to "conserve and enhance" have not curtailed the ability of the Countryside Agency to take action to protect landscapes, should that be required. Indeed, we would find the argument in favour of including the word "protecting" more convincing if the Countryside Agency had drawn any attention to an occasion in the past 40 years when the ability of the Countryside Commission, or Countryside Agency, to take action to protect a landscape had been inhibited by its founding legislation, but we can find no evidence of that at all.
	We have a unique geodiversity and flora and fauna that rely on a rich variety of habitats. I can assure noble Lords that the phrase "conserved, enhanced and managed" in the general purpose includes protection of landscapes. We expect Natural England to be a trenchant champion of every aspect of our natural environment, taking action to protect landscapes where that is the priority.
	The noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, raised the very interesting point about occasions when there is a conflict. But considering how to help—in that case, artificially—to protect the delicate balance, should it get completely out of hand, is part of the role of enhancing and protecting. That is an area that the noble Earl, Lord Peel, will understand particularly well.
	Some people have argued that "protection" applies to biodiversity, thus elevating its status above landscapes. I need to put on the record here that that is not our intention. Including the word "protecting" in Clause 2(2)(a) in relation to biodiversity prevents any spurious claims that Natural England should support activities that may enhance biodiversity adversely, such as through the introduction of non-native species and genetically modified organisms. I am sure that noble Lords have no intention of weakening that particular protection.
	Following pre-legislative scrutiny at the suggestion of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, Clause 15 was amended at subsection (3) to include the requirement to consult Natural England and at subsection (6) to include the clarification that Natural England must have regard to guidance. Clause 15(1) on regional planning was also prompted by an EFRA Committee suggestion that Natural England should be under a duty to contribute to regional spatial strategies. The noble Baroness, Lady Byford, raised the issue of the planning system at a very local level. Having served on a local authority's development control committee, I understand only too well the point that she is making because—

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: In the debate on the Greater London Authority Bill, back in the late 1990s, we debated a regional spatial strategy. I was foolish enough to say that the concept had come to us from Brussels and that some of my colleagues on the Committee would therefore treat it with suspicion. The Chairman of the Committee, Mr Nicholas Winterton, called me sharply to order and said that I was not to bring such a consideration into the debate. I was wholly delighted when Mr Nicholas Rainsford, replying for the Government, said—without actually alluding to myself—that regional spatial strategy was a concept that was being introduced into our affairs from Brussels, whereupon Mr Winterton apologised to me. My noble friend Earl Peel and I had better have a conversation outside the Chamber.